not being a »naval expert« and insisted that his »sole aim« was »to give the facts«^. In the preface to the second, Marder observed that his approach to writing was informed by Sir Charles Firth's dictum that »the art of telling a story is [an] essential quahfication for writing history«^. Marder's goal was to provide information about a particular subject over a particular period, not pose and answer questions. As befitted a Student of Wilham L. Langer, the leading diplomatic historian of his chosen period^ he approached British naval policy as a subset of great power relations. Believing that the larger field had already established the main lines of inquiry', Marder applied himself to the auxiliary task of writing a comprehensive account of a secondary topic that amplified and embroidered an established conceptual framework.
Marder's first book was little more than a collection of loosely connected discussions about disparate subjects. His second, while still discursive, advanced a Single big theme: Admiral Sir John Fisher, his main character, reformed a technically backward and partially corrupted navy in time to meet the challenge of an expansionist Germany. This was presented as a truth to be illuminated, not -as Collingwood had demanded -a question to be tested. Marder's understanding of early twentieth-century naval engineering was superficial and, in certain important respects, inaccurate. He thus reduced disputes over the complex issue of capital ship design to little more than disagreement between technological progressives and conservatives, exacerbated by personality conflict. Above all, what mattered was the threat posed by the German navy, which in the end, Marder argued, not only determined the course of British naval policy, but gave its outcome meaning. Dür-ing the First World War, he concluded, »the destinies of free men« depended upon the Performance of Fisher's modernized fleet'".
In the preface to his first book, Marder informed his readers that he had read »every scrap of published material and innumerable organs of public opinion« and in addition had studied »various unpublished materials of the first importance«, which included previously unavailable Admiralty documents". Over the course of the next twenty years, Marder edited the diary of Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond and a three volume collection of the correspondence of Fisher'^, was allowed special access to the Admiralty's enormous collection of confidential papers, and inspected a large number of documents held by public archives and private individuals. In the preface to his next monograph, he claimed to have read »a mass of unpublished material«, »virtually all published works of any value to the subject«, and official publications and periodicals, and in addition had corresponded with or interviewed »officers and civilians having first-hand knowledge«". Marder believed that command of extant sources was tantamount to authoritative Knowledge, and that barring the discovery of significant materials that he had not examined -which he thought unlikely if not impossible -his rendition of early twentieth-century British naval poUcy was definitive".
As a scissors-and-paste historian by admission and in deed, Marder's historical approach began and ended with sources. His inquiries were not prompted by independent questions about major issues, but by the requirements of creating a plausible narrative out of ready-made statements about his subject. This might call for the exercise of critical judgment when accounts about policy or politics conflicted, but otherwise potentially difficult topics -such as weapons technology, naval finance, manpower, or fleet tactics -that were central concerns of Britain's naval leadership were regarded as sleeping dogs and allowed to slumber out of sight and out of mind. Marder made no use of the many documents concerned with these important matters, which he seems to have regarded as of marginal significance'^.
Marder's methodological backwardness was not limited to his conviction that relevant evidence could be gathered and comprehended without recourse to creative thought. He also believed that British naval policy in the early twentieth Century could be explained in terms of Admiral Fisher as an exponent of technological Innovation, administrative rationalization, promotion by merit and, through his acts of naval reform, the preserver of the liberties of Englishmen. Marder's account was thus flavored heavily with condiments characteristic of the »Whig Interpretation of History« -that is, history made into a record of progress focused on agents of change. In the late 1920s and the early 1930s, Louis Namier'^ and Herbert Butterfield'^ laid the foundations of counter-argument by rejecting as unsound the practice of viewing the past in terms of what came afterwards, and calling instead for the study of process rather outcomes, the immediate motives rather than the ultimate meaning of action, and institutional dynamics and context rather than prominent individuals.
As explained previously, Marder was a diplomatic historian who approached his subject with the presumption that defence policy was determined for the most part by foreign policy considerations. In the 1920s, however, Eckart Kehr, a young German historian, developed an alternative perspective, arguing in his dissertation and early articles that the formulation of foreign and defence policy were strongly influenced and even determined by domestic factors. Kehr was highly critical of the diplomatic history establishment, arguing in 1928 that even the work of the best of them had been »pervaded by a deliberate and disciplined self-limi-tation of the questions« asked'®. In his magnum opus, a book on German battleship building policy between 1894 and 1901 that was published in 1930, Kehr utilized social and economic analysis to expose what he believed was the real domestic motivation behind naval legislation". Kehr, in other words, asked radically new questions that could only be addressed if not answered through the exploitation of nonready-made statements.
The methodological conservatism of Marder's first book may be excused on the grounds that it was conceived not long after the works of Namier, Butterfield, and Kehr had appeared, and before the publication of Colhngwood's main work on the philosophy of history. The similar approach followed in books pubUshed twenty years later, which betray lack of knowledge about or indifference to what by this time were well-known concepts whose value was widely recognized, is perhaps attributable to Marder's intellectual isolation as a professor at a provincial university (Hawaii, 1944-64 ). Marder's antiquated historical technique did not prompt major criticism by members of his field, many of whom taught at distinguished research institutions, which may indicate that hostihty to or ignorance of at least certain new ideas was characteristic of the study of diplomatic and mihtary history^". The almost universal respect accorded to Marder's histories of British naval policy, however, was a manifestation of genuine confidence in their essential validity, the manifest obsolescence of the methods used to produce them notwithstanding, a phenomenon that requires explanation.
Marder's coverage of primary and secondary source material was greater than that of any other scholar of his generation. His early privileged access to restricted Admiralty papers and private communications with partidpants in events of the Fisher era gave him a long head-start over any would-be competitor that was then saying goes, had a quality all of its own. Research that was regarded as unsurpassable conferred the imprimatur of final authority -if all that was to be known was discovered, what more could be necessary? Marder's reputation as the author of the definitive account of the Royal Navy in the Fisher era was also the beneficiary of the fact that his three fundamental assumptions about the period were thought to be self-evidently valid by everyone. These were first, that the battleship Dreadnought, a new model capital ship that was faster and more powerfully armed than its predecessors, represented Fisher's ideal design; second, that the replacement of conventional battleships by dreadnought battleships was the basis of Fisher's policy; and third, that Fisher's Strategie objective above all others was the Containment of the German navy with a larger fleet of dreadnought battleships^. These propositions were, in turn, key components of the widely held view that the rise of the Anglo-German antagonism was the focal point of early twentieth-century British foreign relations and defence policy^'. Belief in the apparent finality of Marder's Interpretation, therefore, was attributable to the conviction that its basic narrative components were part of the warp and weft of what was thought universally to be sound general history.
In fact, the widely-held view of general history was mistaken, Marder's three fundamental assumptions erroneous, and his examination of the relevant evidence incomplete. Marder never posed the question >what was Fisher's capital ship design policy?< because he thought the answer obvious. By the early 1970s, however, the publication of printed primary sources with material related to early twentieth-century British naval policy had reached the point that an attentive reader with an open mind could discern, without great difficulty from what were more or less ready-made statements, that Fisher had opposed the construction of the Dreadnought and had wanted to build only battle cruisers, a new kind of capital ship that was even faster and nearly as heavily armed, but protected by much thinner armor. This conclusion prompted two more questions: >what drove Fisher to formulate such a radical expedient?< and >was it a reasonable, if not practicable, Solution? < These queries could only be addressed through the study of nonready-made statements -specifically financial records and papers dealing with difficult engineering subjects -many of which had to be extracted from collections of documents that Marder had ignored or of whose existence he had not been aware^''. The requisite research, which was undertaken by the author of the present paper in the 1970s and 1980s, produced the following findings. Financial crisis forced the British government to impose limits on naval spending, which made it impossible to continue the construction of up-to-date conventional warships in the numbers required to protect vital maritime interests; these circumstances were exacerbated by im- provements in the torpedo and the invention of the submarine, which raised serious questions about the Strategie and tactical viability of the battleship. Fisher's confidence in the practicabihty of the battle cruiser in spite of its weak protection was based upon a not ill-founded behef that a secret research-and-development project would produce a system of gunnery that would enable British capital ships to damage seriously or even destroy their opponents before they could be hit in return.
These discoveries had serious implications. In the first place, Marder's fundamental assumptions were shown to be inaccurate: the Dreadnought was not Fisher's ideal capital ship, the large fleet of all-big-gun battleships with which Britain entered the First World War could not have been his intended outcome, and his actual desire for the replacement of the battleship by the battle cruiser was motivated in large part by his concerns about trade and imperial defence, not only the security of home waters. In the second place, financial limitation and technological Innovation were demonstrated to be no less important influences on naval policy than foreign policy considerations. Marder could thus be seen to have been wrong about basic things, and his supposed command of all relevant evidence exposed as a canard. Much, however, remained unclear. In particular, the objectives of Fisher's program of administrative reform and its relation to capital ship policy, the function of the submarine, Admiralty-cabinet politics, the development of battle fleet tactics, and the particulars of his strategy of defending the British empire constituted unknown territory.
Lack of knowledge about the subjects just mentioned, and the fact that fear of Germany was still considered by practically everyone to have been the prime motivator of British foreign and naval policy, precluded a direct assault on Marder's presentation of the Fisher era. To have attempted such a task as the main theme of a book would have invited counterattack to which there could as yet be no certain reply -there was fragmentary evidence that was capable of supporting plausible extrapolation, but not argument backed by proof comparable in quality to that which had been gathered in support of the propositions concerned with finance and gunnery. For this reason, the author of the present paper presented his material in the form of a book-Iength monograph on late nineteenth-and early twentieth-century British naval history as a case study of the interconnection of finance, technology, and policy. By this means, major propositions about the dynamics of national security decision-making could be advanced and defended, in the course of which material was presented in passing that could not help but raise doubt about the established view of British naval policy before the First World War. This book was published in 198925.
Over the next decade, the author of the present paper produced three articles on late nineteenth-and early twentieth-century British naval administration and logistics, which identified industrial policy as a crucial influence on naval Strategie planning^''. In 1995, Keith Neilson published a radical reassessment of British for- eign policy between 1894 and 1917 that maintained that British policy-makers considered the Russian threat to the security of the British empire as important as rising German naval and mihtary power. This convincing proposition made the centrality of Anglo-German antagonism to naval policy problematical, which compromised the symbiosis of the Marderian synthesis and diplomatic history^''. But above all, the 1990s witnessed the publication of Nicholas Lambert's articles on the development of Royal Navy submarine policy and Fisher's strategy of home and imperial defence^®, which were the lead up to the publication this year (1999) of a book-length monograph on Fisher that systematically and completely demolished Previous studies, including of course those of Marder, provided a considerable body of Information and references as a point of departure for Lambert's investigations. That being said, the research that was required to investigate this complex and interconnected body of questions was still enormous. Not only did Lambert have to master a literature of secondary and printed primary sources that was considerably larger than that which had confronted Marder, but in addition he had to revisit virtually all of Marder's archival materials, as well as examine many new collections that had not been available to him and which were, moreover, in a number of instances not easily accessible. Lambert was able to make a great deal out of personnel statistics that had never before been utilized. But his effective deployment of nonready-made statements was matched and even surpassed by his use of ready-made statements -that is, texts that were for all intents and purposes explicit and unequivocal in meaning about matters that were directly relevant. This latter evidence was sufficient in quantity and quality to override that of Marder on every point of difference, which were many and major.
Lambert's findings may be summarized as follows. Britain required a navy that could protect outlying imperial possessions, far-flung trade routes, and home waters; all three tasks were vital -one could not be emphasized at the expense of the others without risk of disaster. By the early twentieth Century, Fisher realized that a conventional fleet of battleships and armored cruisers was incapable of carrying out the three functions because the financial cost was larger than any government was Willing to provide, and the personnel requirements of such a force too great to be met through the existing practice of voluntary enlistment. Moreover, improvements in the torpedo raised major doubt as to the tactical viability of the battle fleet. His Solution was strategically, tactically, and technologically revolutionary. The defence of home waters was to be left to large numbers of submarines and fast surface torpedo craft, which he believed were capable of sinking slow troop transports and even large warships with impunity, thus making Invasion impossible. The defence of trade routes and distant colonial waters was to be entrusted to groups consisting of a Single battle cruiser and several light cruisers deployed efficiently by the new wireless communications.
Fisher's force structure in theory would require much fewer ships and, no less importantly, a smaller number of men, and thus would be cheaper to create and maintain. The immunity to invasion conferred by small-craft, which was based upon the radically new concept of sea-denial as opposed to sea control, meant that the Royal Navy's füll strength of large vessels could be committed to the defence of trade and the empire. Multiple independent battle cruiser groups, unlike a single large formation of battleships, would be capable of maneuvering at high speed, which would minimize vulnerability to torpedoes, while a British monopoly of long ränge hitting based upon innovatory methods of fire control was to give battle cruisers the ability to engage and destroy enemy battleships in spite of their relatively weak armor protection. Fisher later extended his Strategie concept to include the idea that battle cruiser gunpower and speed would be increased dramatically from time to time to upset the building programs of foreign rivals.
Fisher fought for the continued construction of capital ships in spite of the insistence of the Liberal government for economy in order to maintain Britain's productive and inventive capacity to build large warships of the most advanced type. To this end, he was Willing to support the building of battleships even though he doubted their effectiveness, and exploited German naval expansion as a counter to the cabinet's claim that building programs could be reduced because Britain's margin of superiority was great enough to provide adequate security. The result, however, was a large and thus unwieldy fleet of heavy ships that was highly vulnerable to torpedo attack. To counter this threat, a faction of the navy called for the addition of cruisers and destroyers to the battle squadrons to create what was known as a >grand fleet of battle<. Most British naval officers, however, doubted that existing methods of communication were fast and reliable enough to enable a Commander to control such a combined arms force effectively under combat conditions.
Fisher opposed the construction of Dreadnought, wanting a battle cruiser only program, but skeptical subordinates at the Admiralty forced a compromise, which provided for both battleships and battle cruisers. Fisher repeatedly attempted to reverse this course, but was unsuccessful in part because his concept of battle cruiser tactics was compromised by delays in the development of the new methods of fire control. The technical improvement of the submarine, however, was swift and thus Royal Navy opinion in favor of the new type grew rapidly. Senior naval officers became convinced that submarines offered a credible deterrent against Invasion, and used this as an argument to counter army demands for increases that were justified as necessary to bolster land forces on home territory. Admiralty confidence in the capability of submarines was indeed so great that the policy of flotilla defence was in practical effect by 1910. And early in 1914, financial crisis that was attributable in part to the building of surface capital ships forced the Admiralty and Liberal leadership to reduce battleship construction, the place of the missing vessels being taken by Orders for more submarines.
Lambert's work compels the drawing of general conclusions that differ radically from long Standard views. First, Fisher was not just a technical radical, but a Strategie and tactical revolutionary, whose scheme came dose to füll Implementation. Second, the British Admiralty was highly receptive to new technology and new ideas about how to use it before the First World War. Third, the Admiralty's efforts to address the threat of German naval expansion did not include abandoning Britain's capacity to project major force into distant seas. Fourth, industrial policy rather than the requirements of foreign relations, was the primary driver of Admiralty capital ship building programs. Fifth, finance was the single most important influence on British naval decision-making. And sixth, the Grand Fleet was not the imperfect fruit of the Royal Navy's single-minded determination to develop the surface battle fleet after decades of effort, but an expedient improvised just a few years before the outbreak of hostilities.
Lambert ends his narrative and analysis in August 1914, which leaves large questions about the war Operations of the Grand Fleet unanswered. His work, however, provides a point of departure for a perspective on the protracted naval campaign in the North Sea that differs fundamentally from Standard accounts. Conflict with Germany as it occurred represented a near best case Strategie scenario -namely, a Royal Navy supported by three major naval powers (France, Russia, and Japan) against a coalition (Germany and Austria-Hungary) whose aggregate naval strength was much weaker and which lacked the overseas bases to support effective campaigns against either British trade or colonies. Prewar planners had wisely prepared for far less favorable circumstances by resorting to flotilla defence at home and heavy ship control abroad. But during the First World War, even though flotilla defence guaranteed the essen tial security -that is, precluded the invasion -of the British isles, there was no reason to deploy large numbers of big surface units away from home waters. The Admiralty, in short, was confronted by an embarrassment of riches. While the army fought desperately in France, the British battle fleet, in the absence of a foolhardy German naval offensive, lay practically idle in northem bases.
Throughout the First World War and afterwards, the relative inactivity of the battle fleet in comparison with the army provided grounds for charges of passivity stemming from lack of offensive spirit. These accusations not only threatened the political and command tenure of politicians and admirals, but undermined the navy's position vis a vis the army in any future discussions of national expenditure on defence'". A frank disclosure of the considerations that had governed the creation of a force of apparently limited Utility under the circumstances that had arisen would have been politically useless and even detrimental to those in power. The better course was to declare that the battle fleet was the guarantor of the security of home waters essential for survival and victory, and that its goal was the destruction of its German counterpart if the opportunity arose. Politics and interservice rivalry, not candor, determined the navy's representation of its prewar policy and wartime strategy. The appearance of well-directed preparation rewarded by ultimate success served large naval interests. But Dreadnought and the scuttling of the interned German warships at Scapa Flow were the unintended artifacts -not the hallmarks -of the Fisher era.
The dismantling of the old Störy and the creation of a new narrative synthesis were the products of a fundamental shift in methodology. Additional evidence was crucial to the task, but the requisite materials did not just surface as a matter of course. Unknown, unused, or misused documents were sought actively by those who approached the task of historical inquiry with questions about substantial issues. The ultimate goal was to teil a story, but not before the domain of the relevant record was redefined and then investigated thoroughly. Scissors-and-paste history, in other words, was replaced by what Collingwood had called the genuinely scientific. The effects of changes in basic technique, moreover, were amplified by cognizance of other methodological innovations that had been pioneered by Namier and Kehr many years before, but which were infrequently employed in the study of twentieth-century British naval history.
The creation of an obligatory exit out of the dead-end of the conventional synthesis opens broad vistas of new scholarly enterprise. British naval industry, Admiralty industrial policy, naval personnel, imperial naval logistics, imperial naval communications and strategy, and Admiralty-cabinet relations, to name only a few important subjects about which too little is known, merit serious investigation on the grounds that they were of critical importance to the formulation of strategy. Conventional notions about the development of naval technology, strategy, and tactics will have to be reevaluated and significantly reformulated. Because of its high financial costs, naval pohcy had a much greater effect on national politics than has previously been supposed, which means that Standard accounts of British politics will need major revision and possibly complete reconstruction. The study of British foreign relations and colonial affairs will have to be reconsidered in light of the new understandings of the nature of naval power. And as these tasks are accomplished, new questions and new information will undoubtedly refine, extend, correct, and ultimately even compromise the vision that seems so true today".
Thus the last word must be left to Collingwood. »No one historian«, he wrote in 1925 in his essay on the nature and aims of a philosophy of history, »can see more than one aspect of the truth; and even an infinity of historians must always leave an infinity of aspects unseen. Historical study is therefore inexhaustible; even the study of a quite small historical field must necessarily take new shape in the hands of every new Student [...] hence no Single historical problem is ever finally solved. All history at its actual best is the provisional and tentative answer to a question which remains at bottom unanswered'^.« 
